This paper studies how the CEO pay level and pay-performance sensitivity vary with her tenure in the firm. Predictions of four theories are considered: entrenchment, learning, career concerns and dynamic contracting hypotheses. We document a positive association between tenure and CEO pay levels, and an analogous positive relation between tenure and the CEO"s payperformance sensitivity. Pay levels of CEOs hired from inside the firm goes up twice as fast with tenure compared to CEOs hired from inside the firm, and CEOs with higher CEO Pay Slice or Gindex have a much stronger tenure-pay level association. Therefore, results for pay levels clearly support the entrenchment hypothesis. Results are also generally consistent with the career concerns and the dynamic contracting hypotheses.
Introduction
There has been considerable academic attention for the relationship between a CEO"s pay and performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990 , Hall and Leibman 1998 , Bebchuk and Fried 2004 . Whereas these studies have focused on whether CEO pay is optimally set or not, we empirically examine how CEO pay varies over a CEO 's tenure. Murphy (1986) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) examine the correlation between stock returns and a CEO"s salary and bonus pay using data from the 1970s-80s, when the incidence of options was very low and was generally not reported. 1 As Perry and Zenner (2001) show, CEO pay has changed substantially from the 1980s to the 1990s, with a much higher reliance on option and (restricted) share grants.
Accordingly, this paper makes the following contributions to the existing literature. First, we are the first to examine how both pay levels and pay-performance sensitivities vary over the CEO"s tenure. Using a large data set from 1992-2007, we test four possible hypotheses from the extant literature: entrenchment, learning, career concerns and dynamic contracting. 2 Second, we examine whether the relationship between pay and tenure is different for share versus option grants. Third, we examine if the relationship depends on the quality of the firm"s information
environment. Fourth, we analyze if the relationship is different between CEOs hired from the inside and hired from the outside. Finally, we examine if corporate governance mechanisms are significantly associated with the pay-tenure relationship.
Under the entrenchment hypothesis of Bebchuk and Fried (2004) , entrenched managers have too much power over their boards and consequently can set their own compensation to the detriment of their own shareholders. More powerful CEOs can increase their pay and make it 1 In a smaller subsample of 73 manufacturing firms for the period 1964 -1983 , Murphy (1986 finds that 40% of CEOs with the less than 4.6 years of tenure received options, when compared to 28% (27%) for CEOs with tenure between 4.6 years and 9 years (for CEOs greater than 9 years). 2 For detailed explanations of each of the theories and their predictions see Section 2 of this paper.
less sensitive to firm performance. Assuming that CEOs with longer tenure are more likely to be entrenched (and vice versa) , then the entrenchment hypothesis suggests a positive effect on the pay level-tenure relationship, and a negative effect on the pay sensitivity-tenure relationship.
Whereas the entrenchment hypothesis is clearly non-optimal from a shareholder"s perspective, the next three hypotheses are based on the optimal contracting literature. The second hypothesis is based on learning about CEO ability and is derived by Murphy (1986) . Under this theory, shareholders and the board learn about the CEO"s managerial over time by observing firm performance. As a result of this learning, deviations from expected performance are more likely to come from random fluctuations rather than from unknown managerial ability in the later years of a CEO"s tenure, such that the firm optimally chooses lower pay-performance sensitivity with increased tenure. This effect would be larger for outsider CEOs or if the firm"s information environment is less opaque. In addition, the pay level of an executive increases with experience as shareholders efficiently update their CEO"s ability.
Under the career concerns hypothesis of Gibbons and Murphy (1992) , the optimal contract is a trade-off between explicit incentives and implicit contracts such as career concerns.
According to this theory, CEOs are incentivized early in their career by establishing their reputation in the labor market, which could partially substitute for a higher explicit incentive contract. Later on in their career, CEOs are given a higher explicit pay-performance sensitivity to compensate for reduced career concerns. Learning about CEO skill thus translates into a positive correlation between the CEO"s pay-performance sensitivity and tenure.
Finally, we examine the dynamic contracting hypothesis of Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik and Sannikov (2009) , wherein the rewards to exerting managerial effort are spread across all future periods to achieve intertemporal risk sharing. A higher pay level and greater pay-performance sensitivity is required as tenure increases, because a risk-averse more-experienced CEO gets less utility from an increase in wealth as she is forced to consume it over fewer periods. As a result, the required lifetime rewards increase over time as well. Their model derives that both the CEO"s pay level and the pay-performance sensitivity level increase with tenure.
We find the following results, consistently showing tenure to have a significant association with both CEO pay levels and pay-performance sensitivities:
1. A positive association of tenure and the level of CEO pay, which is consistent with the entrenchment, learning, and dynamic contracting hypotheses.
2. A positive relation between tenure and the CEO"s total pay-performance sensitivity. This is consistent with the dynamic contracting and career concerns hypotheses.
3. The information environment of firms has no significant association with the CEO pay level and tenure relation, or with the pay-performance sensitivity and tenure relation. Outside
CEOs have a higher pay-performance-sensitivity than inside CEOs over her tenure. These results are generally consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis and not with the learning hypothesis.
4. Considering corporate governance arrangements and the level of pay and tenure association, firms with high CPS or high Gindex tend to have considerably stronger CEO pay-tenure associations than firms with low CPS or low Gindex, consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis. The impact of governance on the sensitivity -tenure association is mixed.
In summary, our results diverge for pay levels versus pay-performance sensitivity.
Results for pay levels strongly support the entrenchment hypothesis, and are inconsistent with the learning hypothesis. They are also consistent with the dynamic contracting hypothesis, which could co-exist with the entrenchment hypothesis. For pay-performance sensitivity, the results are most consistent with the career concerns and dynamic contracting hypotheses, and inconsistent with the learning. Assuming that entrenched CEOs mostly care about pay levels and do not attempt to use any bargaining power vis-à-vis the board to change their incentive structure, the overall evidence supports the entrenchment hypothesis. If managers in low governance firms have greater flexibility in smoothing out her on-the-job compensation, then these results are also consistent with He (forthcoming).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we explain in detail the theories proposing testable hypotheses about the association of CEO tenure and pay. Section 3 describes our data sources and variables, and Section 4 presents our empirical tests and results. We conclude in Section 5.
Theories and their predictions on the tenure-pay relations
This section explains the four theories that have been posited in the previous literature to explain the association between CEO tenure and pay. These theories are managerial entrenchment, learning, career concerns and dynamic contracting. In doing so, we explain their unambiguous predictions with respect to the level of CEO pay, the pay-performance sensitivity, whether the relationships are affected by the quality of the firm"s information environment and corporate governance mechanisms, and whether the CEO is hired from the inside or outside. 3 All the predicted relationships are summarized in Table 1 . ***Table 1***
Entrenchment
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) proposed that entrenched managers have too much power vis-à-vis their boards and can set their own pay, preferring to make it less sensitive to firm performance. Accordingly, under this hypothesis the longer the CEO is in power, the more 3 We do not focus on the impact of tenure on the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover. Dikolli, Mayew, and Nanda (2010) find that the performance-turnover relationship declines in tenure.
entrenched she would seem to be, resulting in a higher pay level and lower pay-performance sensitivity.
The effect of opaqueness of the firm"s information environment could have ambiguous effects on the tenure-pay relation. On the one hand, more opaque firms are might require more monitoring by boards and shareholders which would predict a less positive impact on the tenurepay level relationship and a more positive impact on the CEO"s pay-performance sensitivity in such firms. On the other hand, CEOs might be all powerful with their complicit boards and no amount of opaqueness would affect their pay levels and pay-performance sensitivities.
Given that powerful CEOs have too much power over their board of directors, the entrenchment hypothesis would predict that poorly-governed firms would have more entrenched
CEOs, resulting in a more positive (negative) impact on the tenure-pay relationship (tenure-pay sensitivity relationship) when compared to well-governed firms. Inside CEOs might be more entrenched due to their prior relationships with senior managers, leading to analogous predictions.
Learning
Murphy (1986) proposed the learning hypothesis wherein outside shareholders optimally structure a CEO"s contract so as to learn about the CEO"s ability. 4 Given that the CEO"s ability is less known when the CEO is in her early years, firm performance is more important for updating beliefs in this period. In the later years of a CEO"s tenure, more of the deviation from expected performance is likely to come from random fluctuations than from unknown managerial ability. Accordingly, the learning hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between a CEO"s pay-performance sensitivity and her tenure. In addition, the pay level of an executive 4 Many papers have used learning in other contexts (for example, see Timmerman 1993 , Brennan 1998 , Pastor, Taylor and Veronesi 2007 would expect the association between tenure and pay levels (pay-performance sensitivities) to be stronger for outside CEOs when compared to those hired from inside the firm.
Career Concerns
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) derive the optimal contract as a trade-off between explicit incentives and implicit contracts such as career concerns. 5 The concept of managers" caring about their reputation in the labor market was first expressed by Fama (1980) and more formally developed by Holmstrom (1999) . According to Gibbons and Murphy (1992) , CEOs are implicitly incentivized early in their career from their reputation in the labor market, which could partially substitute for a higher explicit incentive contract. During these years, CEOs would be more willing to undertake costly unobservable managerial actions to correctly increase the market"s assessment of their ability. Later on in their career, CEOs require a higher explicit payperformance sensitivity to compensate them for reduced career concerns. Therefore, one would expect a positive relationship between the CEO"s explicit pay-performance sensitivity and CEO tenure. 6 The career concerns hypothesis makes no predictions about pay levels.
Dynamic Contracting
Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik and Sannikov (2009) model the dynamic contracting hypothesis, wherein the rewards to exerting managerial effort are spread across all future periods to achieve intertemporal risk sharing. A positive pay-performance sensitivity and tenure relation arises in this model due to an "increasing incentives principle." First, if we hold total lifetime reward for good effort constant, pay is spread over fewer periods, causing current pay to increase. Second, a higher pay level and greater pay-performance sensitivity is required as tenure increases, because a risk-averse more-experienced CEO gets less utility from an increase in wealth as she is forced to consume it over fewer periods. As a result, the required lifetime rewards increase over time as well. In the dynamic contracting hypothesis with shareholders facing moral hazard and a riskaverse CEO, stock has to be given to incentivize the CEO to put forward higher effort. But this sharing rule subjects the risk-averse CEO to higher risk and she therefore has to be compensated with a higher pay level as insurance for the higher risk. Note that under this hypothesis, one does not require any implicit contracts such as career concerns to obtain the positive relationship between the CEO"s pay-performance sensitivity and tenure. The dynamic contracting hypothesis 6 We observe that both career concerns and learning have shareholders updating their information about CEO ability, but with opposite predicted signs on the tenure-pay sensitivity relationship. This is because the career concerns model assumes a competitive labor market wherein the CEO with the right ability is assigned to the right firm, and the learning model does not. Under the career concern model, the pay-performance relation is driven by the tradeoff between the incentives to create shareholder value and risk-sharing for the risk-averse CEO. More payfor-performance improves incentives but reduces risk-sharing (if it comes at the cost of say cash salary). In the beginning of the tenure, there is greater uncertainty about ability, and thus risk-sharing is more difficult as the CEO is reluctant to bear so much risk. As tenure increases, risk-sharing becomes easier as the CEO becomes less reluctant to bear firm-specific risk as her risk decreases (i.e., shareholders know more about CEO ability). The learning model does not assume a competitive labor market and is not about risk-sharing. The tradeoff for shareholders is between inducing effort (more effort is better) and cost (paying more is worse) in the context of learning about the CEO"s ability. Therefore, the key difference seems to be driven by the absence or presence of a competitive labor market. 
Variable construction
CEO pay: In order to examine the effect of tenure on a CEO"s level of pay we calculate
Lpay, defined as the natural logarithms of the dollar value of CEO"s total pay (ExecuComp"s TDC1). We also construct three measures of a CEO"s pay-performance sensitivity. Our first measure is the total sensitivity of the CEO"s pay to performance β total which is defined as the sum of β options and β shares . In order to calculate β options we use both the number of option grants given during this fiscal year and outstanding grants from previous years. The sensitivity of options granted during the relevant fiscal year is calculated as the partial derivative of individual stock options granted with respect to a one-dollar change in share price (the Black-Scholes hedge ratio adjusted for dividends), times the ratio of executive option awards to shares outstanding (Yermack 1995) . The risk-free rate is the interest rate on seven-year constant-maturity Treasury bond (ExecuComp"s "risk_free_rate"), and the standard deviation of stock price over the prior sixty months (ExecuComp"s "bs_volatility").
The sensitivity of outstanding options is difficult to determine accurately because we do not know the exercise prices of these grants. This difficulty arises because the annual proxy statements do not report which previously held options have been exercised and which previously granted options remain in the portfolio. We approximate the sensitivity of executive outstanding option holdings by following Core and Guay"s (2002) methodology. In particular, the average exercise price of the exercisable options is assumed to be the difference between the fiscal year end stock price and the ratio of the value of exercisable 7 in-the-money options (ExecuComp"s "inmonex") to the number of unexercised exercisable options (ExecuComp"s "uexnumex"). The term to maturity of the exercisable options is set to be three years less than that of the new option grant (or six years if no new grant was made in that particular year). The average exercise price of the unexercisable options is set to be the difference between the stock price and the ratio of the value of unexercisable in-the-money options (ExecuComp"s "inmonun") to the number of unexercisable options (ExecuComp"s "uexnumex"). The term to maturity of the unexercisable options is set to be one year less than that of the new option grant (or nine years if no new grant was made in that particular year). Using the estimated exercise prices and expiration terms for previous options grants, the sensitivity of CEO"s total option grants is calculated as the sum of the sensitivities of individual exercisable options outstanding, unexercisable options outstanding each multiplied by the corresponding proportion of shares represented by these options. Then β options is the sum of the sensitivities of options granted and options outstanding.
Our third measure is the sensitivity of common stock to a change in stock price (β shares ) and is defined as the number of shares owned divided by total shares outstanding.
CEO tenure:
We proxy for CEO tenure (Tenure) using the number of years the CEO has been chief executive at her firm. 7 An option is said to be exercisable if the option can be exercised within 60 days and is considered to be unexercisable if the manager must wait more than 60 days to exercise the option.
Control variables:
We use a comprehensive set of control variables that have been shown to affect a CEO"s pay-performance sensitivity (for example, see Demsetz and Lehn 1985 , Smith and Watts 1992 , Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 1999 , and Palia 2001 . We begin by including the natural logarithm of the CEO"s age (Age) so as to ensure that our results on CEO tenure are not really picking up the effect of younger or older CEOs getting different compensation packages. 8 We also control for the size of the company by taking the natural logarithm of the firm"s market capitalization (Ln_Marketcap) and the firm"s sales (Ln_Marketcap2). We control for the firm"s profitability by including the return on assets (ROA) ratio, and the firm"s Herfindahl Index (HHI) defined as the sum of squares of the firm"s market share by sales at 2 digit level. We include different measures of the firm"s risk: Sigma, defined as the standard deviation of the firm"s stock price over the prior sixty months, the firm"s market risk,
Beta, defined as the regression coefficient of the firm"s stock returns on the market portfolio, and
Dyield, defined as the firm"s dividend yield. We include two measures to capture intangible assets, namely the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to assets (PPE) and the ratio of capital expenditure to assets (Capex). Finally, we control for the firm"s leverage, Debt, defined as the ratio of total balance sheet leverage to assets.
The data on the inside versus outside CEO hires were hand collected and provided by
Cremers and Grinstein (2009), which one can refer to for more details. In line with the literature, if the CEO was affiliated with the current firm for less than two years before becoming CEO, the CEO is classified as an outsider CEO.
We use three measures to capture the firm"s corporate governance environment. 9 The first is the Gindex, created by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) as an index of anti-takeover provisions that assist managers in resisting takeovers. A higher value of the Gindex reflects fewer shareholder rights or more takeover defenses, and is a proxy of the entrenchment of the board vis-à-vis shareholders. The second measure is the fraction of the board that is independent (Board_Indep). Baysinger and Butler (1985) , Mehran (1995) , and Klein (1998) find that firm value is positively related to the proportion of outsiders on the board. Grey directors, those directors that have some prior or current business affiliation with the company are treated as dependent directors. The third measure is the CEO Pay Slice (CPS), or the fraction of the total compensation of the group of top-five executives of the firm, that is given to the CEO. Bebchuk,
Cremers and Peyer (forthcoming) document that high CPS firms are characterized with lower valuations and profitability, consistent with CEOs and boards that are more entrenched.
All the above variables are summarized in Table 2 and their descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3 . The pay-performance sensitivity using shares owned can only be calculated for about half the firm-year observations, in which case we set it to zero when calculating the total pay-performance sensitivity. ***Tables 2 and 3*** Figure 1 shows the marginal and cumulative distributions of CEO tenure in our sample (on the left and right axes, respectively). The median tenure equals five years. Table 4 provides the correlation matrix for the tenure and CEO age variables. Given the relative high correlations between, for example, Ln_Tenure and Ln_Tenure2 (its square), we verify for all specifications that multicollinearity does not generate statistical problems using the "variance inflation factor" test. 
Basic Results for Tenure and CEO Pay
We begin by examining the relationship between CEO tenure and the level of CEO pay.
The four theories explained in Section 2 only predict the sign or the slope of the tenure-pay relationship. Our three empirical specifications also allow possible nonlinear relationships. We begin by use a specification with ten tenure dummies, one dummy for each of the first ten years of a CEO"s tenure. We then capture parsimoniously a linear relationship by using Ln_Tenure which give less weight to CEOs with very long tenures. The third specification includes the quadratic term Ln_Tenure2.
Critically, all specifications throughout the paper are run with CEO-firm fixed effects, which controls for unobserved (but time-invariant) heterogeneity at the CEO-firm level. As a result, the coefficients on the various tenure variables can be interpreted as measuring the timeseries association between pay and tenure for a given CEO: how does the pay level change if a given CEO stays in the job?
We run pooled panel regressions of the log of total CEO pay regressions (L pay ) on the CEO tenure variable(s), including all the control variables described above plus year dummies.
Throughout the paper, all standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are clustered by firm. In all tables we do not report the results on the year dummies which are individually and jointly statistically significant. Results of the L pay regressions are presented in Table 5 . *** Table 5 ***
In the first column of Table 5 , we find that the coefficients of the ten tenure dummies in indicate an increasing pattern. Any further tenure dummies (after ten years of tenure) are all insignificant if added to the specification shown. This result is confirmed in columns (2) and (3), suggesting a positive and statistically significant relation between total CEO pay and tenure.
When we examine the control variables we find that larger (by market capitalization and sales) and more profitable (ROA) firms pay a higher level of pay. Given that these firms are able to attract more talented CEOs our results are consistent with Gabaix and Landier (2008) . We find a statistically insignificant effect between the level of CEO pay and CEO age. We also find that risker firms (by beta and volatility) also pay their CEOs a higher level of pay. Firms with higher intangibles (lower property, plant and equipment) paid their CEOs a lower level of pay. Finally, firms with higher dividend yields also have higher paid CEOs, though this association is only marginally significant. Figure 2 plots the association between the log of total CEO pay and tenure for the three different specification using the fitted values and tenure-related variables only. Each specification is rescaled to start at zero for tenure equal to one year. The association between pay levels and tenure is clearly non-linear in tenure, as the specification with the dummies indicates.
In general, the increase in pay levels with tenure is larger in the beginning and then tends to decrease with increases in tenure after about six years.
The non-linearity could be captured by a step-wise linear specification (e.g. linear with
tenure from 1-5 years, less steep with tenure from 6-10 years, flat after that), but for simplicity we prefer the log transformation of tenure in all subsequent specifications. This simplicity is especially useful when interaction tenure with various firm and CEO characteristics in subsequent analyses. However, results in the paper are robust to using a step-wise linear specification instead.
The figure also shows that the economic importance of tenure on total CEO pay levels is considerable. For example, going from one to six years of tenure is associated with an increase in total pay of about 20%. The specification using Ln_Tenure implies a smaller though still economically strong increase in those five years of 9.2%. Adding Ln_Tenure2 hardly changes things.
***Figure 2*** Finding a positive relationship is consistent with the entrenchment, learning, and the dynamic contracting hypotheses but for different reasons. Under entrenchment, the CEO extracts higher levels of pay because she is very powerful, whereas under the learning and dynamic contracting hypotheses, higher levels of pay are required to compensate the risk averse CEO for receiving a higher incentive contract.
Next, we examine the total pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO (β total ). As discussed above, a negative relationship is consistent with the entrenchment and learning hypotheses, and a positive relation with the career concerns and dynamic contracting hypotheses.
We again estimate the three regressions with industry, firm and CEO-firm-effects, respectively, plus year dummies and other controls. The results of these regressions are given in Table 6 . We again summarize these results in Figure 3 , which plots the associations between tenure and β total for the three specifications.
*** Examining the control variables we find a strong positive relationship between CEO age and the CEO"s total pay-performance sensitivity. This result is consistent with hypothesis 1 of Gibbons and Murphy (1991) wherein age is positively related to the CEO"s total payperformance sensitivity holding tenure constant. We also find that find that smaller (by market capitalization and sales) and more profitable (ROA) firms have CEOs with a higher payperformance sensitivity. Given that these firms are able to attract more talented CEOs our results are consistent with Gabaix and Landier (2008) . We find a statistically insignificant effect between the level of CEO pay and CEO age. We find a statistically insignificant relationship between firm risk (by beta and volatility), intangibles (lower property, plant and equipment) and the CEO"s total pay-performance sensitivity. Firms with higher leverage, lower dividends and incurring higher capital expenditure also award their CEOs a high total pay-performance sensitivity. Figure 3 plots the association between the CEO"s pay-performance sensitivity and tenure for the three different specification using the fitted values and tenure-related variables only. Once again, each specification is rescaled to start at zero for tenure equal to one year. We find that increasing tenure has an economically relevant positive association with the total payperformance sensitivity. For example, increasing tenure from one to six years is associated with an increase in β total of about 0.8% using the dummy specification, compared to a median β total of 1.29%. The specifications with Ln_Tenure and Ln_Tenure2 result in a similar pattern, implying a weaker (though still meaningful) economic association than the specification using dummies,.
For example, the coefficient on Ln_Tenure suggests that increasing tenure from one to six years is associated with an increase in β total of about 0.6%. ***Figure 3*** The strong positive relationship between and the CEO"s total pay-performance sensitivity and tenure is inconsistent with the entrenchment and learning hypothesis. It is consistent with both the dynamic contracting and the career concerns hypotheses, but for different reasons. The career concerns hypothesis suggests a positive relationship because the manager has less implicit incentives later in her career, whereas under the dynamic contracting hypothesis the manager gets less utility from an increase in wealth, as she will have to consume it over fewer periods.
We next examine whether these results are driven by options and/or shares, where options have much convexity or implied leverage that can significantly increase payperformance sensitivity. It is possible that the effect of options could be diametrically opposite of the effect of shares, and that the relations we have estimated using total sensitivity is of the more dominant incentive program. Table 7 presents results of pooled panel regressions of β options in the first three columns (columns 1 to 3), and for β shares in the next three columns (columns 4 to 6).
We again include year dummies and CEO-firm fixed effects throughout plus all the controls of Table 6 , which are not shown for brevity. We find a strong positive relationship in all three specifications.
***Table 7*** Considering the results for β options in columns 1 -3, we find a consistently positive and statistically significant relationship with tenure. Figure 4 suggests that the economic magnitude of increasing tenure from one to six years is associated with an increase in β options of 0.13% (using Ln_Tenure) to 0.25% (using the tenure dummies), as compared to a median β options of 0.7%. The results for β shares in columns 4 -6 also suggest a positive relationship with tenure using either the tenure dummies or Ln_Tenure (or Ln_Tenure2). Indicated by Figure 5 , the economic magnitude of increasing tenure from one to six years is associated with an increase in β shares of 0.4% (using Ln_Tenure) to 0.6% (using the tenure dummies).
*** Figures 4 and 5***
We conclude that the evidence for the pay-performance sensitivity is most consistent with a positive relation with tenure, consistent with the career concerns and dynamic contracting hypotheses, and inconsistent with the entrenchment and learning hypotheses.
Information Environment and Learning
This section examines the importance of the firm"s information environment for the relationship of tenure with pay levels and the pay-performance sensitivity. The main purpose for doing so is to further investigate the learning hypothesis, which predicts that the board has considerable ex-ante uncertainty about the skills of the CEO that is resolved through observing the firm"s performance. Surviving CEOs are those about whom the board has received positive information, and whom consequently will receive higher pay. The learning hypothesis could potentially explain the strong positive association between tenure and pay levels. At the same time, the positive association between tenure and pay-performance sensitivity is inconsistent with the learning hypothesis, but could potentially be due to firm with little or very slow learning.
We posit that if the firm"s information environment is more opaque, such learning will be slower, resulting in a weaker association for tenure. Specifically, Bayesian updating of existing beliefs is greater if the new signal has lower volatility (i.e., more precision) or if the ex-ante beliefs or priors have greater uncertainty (see e.g. Pastor and Veronesi (2009)).
We use two measures to capture the firm"s information environment. The first measure is a proxy for the precision of signals as measured by the firm"s residual stock return volatility, Resvol, calculated over the fiscal year using daily excess returns and relative to the four-factor Fama-French-Carhart model. The second measure is a proxy for the ex-ante lack of uncertainty about value of the assets in place, as measured by the firm"s fraction of tangible assets (i.e., property, plants, and equipment divided by the book value of total assets), PPE. A lower PPE ratio suggests more intangible assets, implying a more uncertain information environment facing the firm. 13 For both proxies, we create two dummy variables set to unity for all firms in the lowest (Low_Resvol and Low_PPE) and highest quartile (High_Resvol and High_PPE) of each proxy in a particular year, and zero otherwise. We interact the dummy variables with Ln_Tenure, the results of which are presented in Table 9 . We include all the controls of Table 6 , which are not shown for brevity.
***Table 8***
The information environment seems to make little difference to the level of pay (columns 1-2). All interactions with Resvol quartile dummies are insignificant (column 1), as is the interaction with PPE quartile dummies (column 2). When we examine the CEOs total payperformance sensitivity (columns 3-4) we once again find a statistically insignificant relationship. These statistically insignificant results are also confirmed when we analyze options (columns 5-6) and shares (columns 7-8) separately. We thus also find no evidence that the positive association of CEO tenure with pay-performance sensitivity is driven by more opaque firms, where learning may be more difficult. In conclusion, we find no support for the learning hypothesis when conditioning on the information environment.
Inside versus Outside CEOs: Entrenchment and Learning
The difference between CEO hired from inside versus outside the firm could potentially be used to differentiate the entrenchment and learning hypotheses. Both of these predict a positive tenure association for pay levels and a negative tenure association for pay-performance sensitivity. However, learning seems likely to be more important for outside CEOs, while these same CEOs seem less likely to be entrenched. As a result, under the learning hypothesis, we would expect the predicted associations to be stronger for outside CEOs, with the opposite under the entrenchment hypothesis.
We create a dummy Inside_CEO, which equal to unity if the CEO is hired from inside the firm, and zero otherwise. In Table 9 , we report the results of specifications with Ln_Tenure and its interaction with this dummy, for L pay (column 1), β total (column 2), β options (column 3) and β shares (column 4). We include all the controls and year dummies, which are not shown for brevity. Results using both Ln_Tenure and Ln_Tenure2 are very similar and not reported.
***Table 9***
The main result is that tenure of insider CEOs has a twice as positive associations with pay levels as tenure of outside CEOs, which difference is marginally statistically significant with a p-value of 9%. The pay-performance sensitivity of insider and outsider CEOs is no different.
The much higher positive association between tenure and pay levels for insider CEOs, about whom the board should have better information when first hired, is consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis and inconsistent with the learning hypothesis.
Governance and Entrenchment
Under the entrenchment hypothesis, poorly-governed firms with their more entrenched CEOs would award their CEOs a higher (or more positive) pay level when compared to wellgoverned firms. Such poorly governed firms would also provide lower incentives (payperformance sensitivities) when compared to well-governed firms. We investigate this hypothesis further by considering the governance structure of the firm using three proxies to capture the firm"s governance structure: Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick"s (2003) index of anti-takeover provisions (Gindex), the fraction of the board that comprises of independent directors (Board_Indep), and the CEO Pay Slice (CPS) or the fraction of the total pay of the top-five executive team that goes to the CEO. A higher value of the Gindex reflects fewer shareholder rights or more takeover defenses, and is a proxy of CEO entrenchment.
Baysinger and Butler (1985) , Mehran (1995) and Klein (1998) find that Board_Indep and firm value is positively correlated, consistent with more monitoring and less entrenchment of the CEO. Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (forthcoming) find that high CPS firms are characterized with lower firm valuations, lower operating performance and more firm decisions that appear questionable (such a lower M&A announcement returns and more frequent option backdating), consistent with CEOs and boards that are more entrenched.
As before, for each of these three measures we create a dummy variable to capture the lowest quartile (Low_), and a dummy variable to capture the highest quartile (High_). These variables are then interacted with the tenure variables, the results of which are given in Table 10 .
We include all the controls and year dummies, which are not shown for brevity. The results for pay levels (L pay ) are given in columns 1-3, total pay-performance sensitivity (β total ) in columns 4-6, sensitivity of options (β options ) in columns 7-9, and sensitivity of shares (β shares ) in columns 10-12.
***Table 10*** Considering corporate governance arrangements and the level of pay and tenure association, firms with high CPS tend to have considerably stronger CEO pay-tenure associations than firms with low CPS. We find a similar relationship for firms with a high
Gindex as compared with firms with a low Gindex. These results are generally consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis. The economic significance of governance for the association between tenure and pay levels is strongest for CPS, and is depicted in Figure 6 . ***Figure 6*** For CEOs with low CPS, there is essentially no relationship between pay levels and tenure. However, for CEOs with high CPS, the association is quite strong, with an increase from one to size years of tenure associated with an 11% pay increase.
The impact of governance seems to be mixed on the pay sensitivity-tenure association.
For example, we find a more positive association between tenure and pay-performance sensitivity for firms with more independent boards, but also for firms with higher Gindex scores.
Similar mixed evidence is found for both options and shares, and in general, the statistical significance of any differences and the overall effects are relatively weak (i.e., when summing up the coefficients of Ln_Tenure with the coefficients of any of its interactions).
In summary, this subsection documents very strong support for the entrenchment hypothesis, especially assuming that entrenched CEOs mostly care about pay levels and do not attempt to use any bargaining power vis-à-vis the board to change their incentive structure. If we assume that managers in firms with weaker governance have greater flexibility in smoothing out her on-the-job compensation, the positive relationship between pay levels and tenure for low governance firms is also consistent with He (forthcoming).
Conclusions
This paper examines the relationship between a CEO"s pay levels and pay-performance sensitivity and her tenure in the firm. The previous empirical literature had examined such issues used historical data that did not include the large amounts of incentive pay (such as options and shares that were introduced in the 1990s). We examine the predictions of four theories (namely, entrenchment, learning, career concerns and dynamic contracting) from the extant literature in order to test the impact of tenure on pay levels and pay-performance sensitivities.
We find a positive relationship between tenure and CEO pay levels, as well as a positive correlation between CEO tenure and the CEO"s pay-performance sensitivity Examining the impact of the firm"s information environment, we find no significant association with the CEO pay level and tenure relation, or with the pay-performance sensitivity and tenure relation. This seems inconsistent with the learning hypothesis, or at least provides no support for it.
Pay levels of inside CEOs go up twice as fast with tenure as pay levels of outside CEOs, which is again inconsistent with the learning hypothesis but could be explained by entrenchment.
Considering corporate governance arrangements and the association between tenure and the level of pay, we find that firms with high CPS (or high Gindex) tend to have considerably stronger CEO pay-tenure associations than firms with low CPS (or low Gindex), again consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis. The impact of governance seems to be mixed on the sensitivitytenure association.
In conclusion, the interpretation of our results diverges for pay levels versus payperformance sensitivity. Results for pay levels seem most consistent overall with the entrenchment hypothesis, and inconsistent with the learning hypothesis. For pay-performance sensitivity, the results are most consistent with the career concerns and dynamic contracting hypotheses, and inconsistent with the learning. If entrenched CEOs care primarily about pay levels, even if some of the additional pay comes in the form of options and shares, then the positive association between tenure and pay-performance sensitivity would not be inconsistent with the entrenchment hypothesis either. Finally, overall results are also consistent with the career concerns and dynamic contracting hypothesis, which could co-exist with the entrenchment hypothesis.
Figure 1: Distribution of CEO Tenure
This figure plots the marginal distribution (left-side scale, solid line) and the cumulative distribution (right-side scale, dotted line) of CEO tenure in years, using the full sample of 15,972 observations (see Table 3 ). This figure plots the relationship between CEO Tenure and the total CEO pay-performance sensitivity (β total ) using the fitted values from Table 6 (columns 1 -4) and Table 8 (column 2) using tenure-related variables only and rescaling each series to start at zero for tenure equal to one year.
-0.10% Table 7 (columns 1 -4) and Table 8 Table 7 (columns 1 -4) and Table 8 (column 4) using tenure-related variables only and rescaling each series to start at zero for tenure equal to one year.
-0.10% The results are obtained from pooled panel regressions of CEO pay levels (L pay ) on the various independent variables. See Table  2 for variable descriptions. All specifications include fiscal year and CEO-firm effects. In parentheses, we present t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) The results are obtained from pooled panel regressions of the CEO"s total pay-performance sensitivity (β total ) on the various independent variables. See Table 2 for variable descriptions. All specifications include fiscal year and CEO-firm effects. In parentheses, we present t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The coefficients on Ln_Tenure and Ln_Tenure2 are multiplied by 1,000. Table 2 for variable descriptions. All specifications include fiscal year and CEO-firm effects. In parentheses, we present t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The coefficients on Ln_Tenure and Ln_Tenure2 are multiplied by 1,000 and all controls in Table 6 are included but not reported for brevity.
Sensitivity of options compensation (β options ) Sensitivity of shares compensation (β shares )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) The results are obtained from pooled panel regressions of CEO pay levels (L pay ) on the various independent variables. All specifications include fiscal year and CEO-firm effects. In parentheses, we present t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All controls in Table 6 are included but not reported for brevity. See Table 2 The results are obtained from pooled panel regressions of the total CEO pay (L pay ,), the CEO"s total pay sensitivity to performance (β total ) and the CEO"s pay sensitivity of options (β options ,) and shares (β shares ) to performance on the various independent variables. See Table 2 for variable descriptions. All specifications include fiscal year and CEO-firm effects. In parentheses, we present t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All controls in Table 5 are included but not reported for brevity. All coefficients for the pay-performance sensitivity measures (β total , β options ,, and β shares ) are multiplied by 1,000. _Inside_CEO is an interaction with a dummy that equals 1 if the CEO comes from inside the firm, and equals zero otherwise. The results are obtained from pooled panel regressions of the total CEO pay (L pay ,), the CEO"s total pay sensitivity to performance (β total ) and the CEO"s pay sensitivity of options (β options ,) and shares (β shares ) to performance on the various independent variables. See Table 2 for variable descriptions. All specifications include fiscal year and CEO-firm effects. In parentheses, we present t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All controls in Table 5 are included but not reported for brevity. All coefficients for the pay-performance sensitivity measures (β total , β options ,, and β shares ) are multiplied by 1,000. Low-_CPS (High_CPS) is a dummy indicating the CEO pay slice being in the lowest (highest) quartile each year. Low_Board_Indep (High_Board_Indep) is a dummy indicating that the faction of board member being in the lowest (highest) quartile each year. Low_Gindex (High_Gindex) is a dummy indicating that the antitakeover shareholder rights being in the lowest (highest) quartile each year. 
